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Abstract
We exploit the regional variation in negative attitudes towards immi-
grants to Sweden in order to analyse what are the consequences of such
attitudes have on immigrantswelfare. A well educated immigrant from
a non developed country who lives in a municipality with strong negative
attitudes earns less than what she would earn if she lived in a municipality
where natives are more positive. If attitudes changed from the average
level to the most positive level, her wage would increase by 12%. This
would reduce the wage gap to well-educated immigrants from developed
countries by 70%. We interpret this e¤ect as evidence of labour market
discrimination. The same reduction in negative attitudes would increase
the welfare of immigrants from Africa and Asia, through their wage and
local amenities, by an equivalent to one third of their wage. The analo-
gous amount for immigrants from South America and Eastern Europe is
one fourth of their wage if they are well educated and one tenth otherwise.
1 Introduction
Attitudes toward immigration reveal deep views about economic self-interest
and social identity. If nativesattitudes are based on their economic interests,
those who benet from immigration will support it, and those who are economi-
cally hurt by immigration will oppose it. A second reason for negative attitudes
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is racism, xenophobia or milder forms of nationalist sentiment that turn na-
tives against foreigners1 . We identify attitudes towards immigration through
attitudes towards the immigrants themselves.
Unlike in the US, immigration to Sweden is a relatively recent phenomenon,
yet it has reached similar proportions. The share of foreign born in the popula-
tion in Sweden was less than one percent in 1900. By 1960, 4% of the population
were born abroad. The share of foreign born had increased to almost 13% in
2006, while the same share was 12.5% in the US.
Immigration to Sweden was insignicant until World War II. During the rst
post-war decades, there was a sharp increase in demand for labour and workers
were recruited from other European countries, rst from other Nordic countries
and later from Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland and Italy. These immigrants
were accepted because they were wanted in the labour market. There are no
reliable opinion polls dealing with peoples views on immigration from that
time, but the early labour immigrants adapted fairly well and gradually became
accepted in the cities where they settled.
Since the 1970s, when there was a change in the economic conditions and
the need for labour all but disappeared, immigration to Sweden has become
increasingly restricted to political refugees and their families. Refugees then
mainly came from Chile, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and former Yugoslavia. Many
studies have detected the existence of negative attitudes towards immigrants
in Sweden since the 1970s2 . The rise in the share of votes for anti-immigration
parties since the late 1980s is further evidence of the prevalence of such attitudes.
Still, studies making a comparison across countries in Europe nd that Sweden
is one of the countries with the most generous attitudes. For example, Card
et. al. (2005) study how attitudes di¤er with the immigrants characteristics.
People tend to be more negative to immigrants of a di¤erent ethnicity and
immigrants from less prosperous countries. Respondents who favour a tighter
1Card et. al. (2005) describe models of economic self-interest, and then discuss broader
sociological models focused on aspects of identity and group a¢ liation.
2Some examples are the Intolerance Report (Intolerans 2004) and Westin(2000).
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immigration policy tend to put more weight on being a Christian or being of
white ethnicity. Thus, immigrants do not constitute a homogeneous group and
the attitudes towards subgroups can di¤er substantially.
In this paper, we are not interested in the causes of negative attitudes to-
wards immigrants; instead we want to analyse the consequences of such atti-
tudes on immigrantswelfare. Even though we recognize that not every native
with negative attitudes would discriminate, we think that negative attitudes are
systematically related to discrimination. Thus, we will be referring to discrimi-
nation in the paper despite the fact that we can only measure attitudes.
We formulate a simple model where negative attitudes a¤ect immigrants
welfare through two channels: i) immigrantswages through discrimination in
the labour market and ii) immigrantsamenities, that is, the attractiveness of
a geographic location, discrimination in the housing market, schools, hospitals,
treatment in the streets, etc. Immigrants maximize their welfare by making a
location choice where local attitudes play a major role.
The immigrantsgeographic sorting is usually based on both observable and
unobservable factors, which makes it di¢ cult to study the e¤ect of negative
attitudes on their labour market outcomes and location decisions. To avoid
(part of) that problem, we concentrate on a group of immigrants for which
there is an exogenous source of variation in their rst location in Sweden. This
variation is given by a refugee settlement policy pursued by the government from
1985 to 1994, whereby newly arrived refugees were placed in di¤erent regions
according to certain well-dened criteria. There were no restrictions on mobility
after this rst placement, however.
We take into account that nativesattitudes towards immigrants can di¤er
by considering two kinds of heterogeneity, by origin and by level of education.
We dene three origin groups. Refugees belong to group B if they come from
Africa and non developed countries in Asia and to group G if they come from
South America or Eastern Europe. We expect group B to be more a¤ected
by attitudes than group G, as the members of this group are ethnically more
distant from Swedes and come from less prosperous countries. A third group,
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W, composed by immigrants from developed countries, is also dened. These
immigrants are not refugees, they were never placed and we expect them to be
much less a¤ected by negative attitudes. They are included as a placebo group.
When it comes to education, we call those immigrants who have attained at
least high school "well educated".
The placement of refugees in a region may exacerbate negative attitudes
towards them. This problem is addressed by considering the data on attitudes
measured prior to the refugee settlement policy. We obtain our measure of atti-
tudes towards immigrants from ve surveys on Swedish Opinion (Svensk opin-
ion), collected from 1979 to February 1985 by Stiftelsen för Opinionsanalyser.
The empirical purpose of this paper is to exploit the regional variation in
negative attitudes towards immigrants to analyse whether labour market out-
comes and the mobility decisions of immigrants (refugees) are systematically
related to such attitudes.
In a nutshell, we nd that attitudes towards immigrants matter; they a¤ect
both labour market outcomes and location decisions. Well educated immigrants
from non developed countries receive lower wages when they live in a munic-
ipality with more negative attitudes. If attitudes became more positive and
changed from their average level to the most positive level, this would increase
these immigrantswages by 12%.
Immigrants from non developed countries prefer to live in municipalities
where attitudes towards them are less negative. Our estimates imply that less
educated immigrants from Africa and Asia are willing to sacrice as much as
34% of their wages to enjoy living in a municipality with zero negative attitudes
rather than average attitudes. Well educated immigrants from Africa and Asia
would accept a reduction of 23% of their wages and immigrants from South
America and Eastern Europe a reduction of 11%, independent of their level of
education.
Related Research
Our paper relates to research on the discrimination of immigrants in the labour
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market, and in particular, the empirical research related to Sweden.
The relationship between wages and discrimination in our simple model is
justied by the results of a companion paper, Larsen and Waisman (2007), that
introduces labour market discrimination in a search model (following Borjas and
Bronars (1989)).
The model in our paper relates both to research on individuals migration
decision (Sjaastad (1962)) and self-selection (Roy (1951)). Nakosteen and Zim-
mer (1980) and Borjas et. al. (1992) apply Roys self-selection framework to
internal migration. Our paper considers self selection in the migration decision
in the spirit of a Roy model.
There are some empirical studies analysing the internal migration decision
in Scandinavia. Åslund (2001) nds that immigrants to Sweden are attracted to
regions with many immigrants from their own country of birth and, in general,
better labour market opportunities and many welfare recipients. Damm and
Rosholm (2005) nd that the hazard rate into rst job of refugee immigrants to
Denmark is decreasing in the local population size and the local share of immi-
grants and that geographical mobility had large, positive e¤ects on the hazard
rate into rst job, thus suggesting that restrictions on placed refugeessubse-
quent out-migration would hamper the labour market integration of refugees.
None of these studies considers the e¤ect of di¤erent attitudes towards immi-
grants on their migration decision.
Several empirical studies (for example Bevelander and Skyt Nielsen (1999),
Arai et. al. (1999) and Arai and Vilhelmsson (2004)) have found lower income
and employment rates for immigrants than for comparable natives in Sweden.
These studies cannot tell us if the di¤erences are caused by ethnic discrimination
or di¤erences in unobserved characteristics of the two populations. By analysing
the di¤erence in labour market outcomes in regions with di¤erent attitudes
towards immigrants, we intend to test discrimination in a more direct way.
There are other studies performing di¤erent types of more direct tests of dis-
crimination in Sweden. Rooth (2001) analysed the labour market performance
of adoptees with dissimilar looks to natives and concluded that discrimination
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against skin colour may exist in the Swedish labour market. Åslund and Rooth
(2005) found no sign of increased discrimination against certain immigrants to
Sweden after the temporary change of attitudes caused by the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001. Carlsson and Rooth (2006) performed a eld exper-
iment in May 2005 to February 2006 which showed every fourth employer to
discriminate against men with Arabic sounding names in the hiring process.
Compared to these studies, ours is more general as it is not restricted to certain
groups of immigrants.
In the next section, we will present a simple model that can help us under-
stand how negative attitudes a¤ect immigrants.
2 Some Simple Theory
Consider an immigrant who derives utility from the consumption of goods af-
forded by her wage and amenities, that is, di¤erent features that increase quality
of life. In the same spirit as a Roy model, di¤erent geographical areas are mod-
elled as having di¤erent earnings and di¤erent amenity benets for di¤erent
immigrants. These local amenities a¤ect quality of life because people have
preferences for certain types of areas; they may prefer to live in temperate cli-
mates more than in severe ones, for instance3 .
Each geographic location is characterized by a level of negative attitudes
towards immigrants, determined by the share of the population that dislikes
immigrants. Negative attitudes towards immigrants potentially a¤ect both com-
ponents of the utility function. When we model how negative attitudes a¤ect
immigrants, we will think of discrimination. In a companion paper, Larsen and
Waisman (2007), we study the e¤ects of discrimination of immigrants on the
labour market within a search and wage-bargaining setting. In such a setting,
discrimination implies that the wages received by immigrants are lower than the
wages received by natives, even when they face a non-discriminatory employer.
3Graves (1979), Mueser and Graves (1995) and Hu¤man and Feridhanusetyawan (2007)
show evidence of amenities a¤ecting peoples migration decisions and welfare.
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Amenities or quality of life may be a¤ected by negative attitudes in many dif-
ferent ways. For example, negative attitudes can induce discrimination in the
housing market, at schools or in hospitals.
We represent the utility for individual i in region j by the following equation
U ji
 
dj

= wji
 
dj

+Aji
 
dj

; (1)
where wji denotes wage, A
j
i the amenities and d
j the level of negative attitudes
in region j:
Every immigrant maximizes utility by making a location choice. When de-
ciding where to live, he/she considers the level of wages and the quality of life
he/she expects to receive in di¤erent geographical locations. He/she will move
to region k if
Uki
 
dk

> U ji
 
dj

+ Ci; (2)
where Ci reects the immigrants individual costs of moving.
According to this simple location model, we expect more immigrants to move
into or stay in regions with less negative attitudes. If two groups of immigrants
are di¤erently a¤ected by attitudes and have similar costs for moving, then we
expect a higher frequency of movement in the most a¤ected group. The e¤ect
of negatives attitudes on wages and the location decision will be studied in the
empirical section.
3 Empirical Background, Data and Method
Immigrants choose where to live on basis of many factors. They may choose
to live where natives are not negative towards them, where the labour market
opportunities are good, where the weather and other geographic conditions are
more similar to their home countries, where many other immigrants speak their
own language, etc. Immigrantssorting is based on both observable and unob-
servable factors which makes it generally di¢ cult to study the e¤ect of negative
attitudes on labour market outcomes and location decisions. We will therefore
study a group of immigrants for which there is an exogenous source of variation
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in their rst location in Sweden given by a refugee settlement policy that the
government pursued from 1985 to 1994.
The refugee settlement policy placed newly arrived refugees in di¤erent lo-
cal municipalities according to certain well-dened criteria. The idea of the
programme was to get a more even distribution of immigrants and facilitate
integration. In practice, the distribution was mainly determined by housing
availability. There was no interaction between municipal o¢ cers and refugees,
so the selection was, by denition, purely made on basis of observed characteris-
tics; language, formal qualications, and family size seem to have been the main
criteria. Preferences were given to highly educated individuals and individuals
that spoke the same language as some members of the resident immigrant stock.
The assignment of municipality was not the immigrantschoice and was inde-
pendent of unobserved individual characteristics giving a quasi-experimental
character to the data, as described by Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003).
These authors argue that the housing market was booming, thus making it
di¢ cult to nd vacant housing in attractive areas.
The government settlement policy clearly increased the dispersion of immi-
grants. Before 1985, refugees were allowed to choose where to settle. In 1985,
the immigrant shares in Stockholm and the north of Sweden were at 36% and
5%, respectively. By 1991, the share living in Stockholm had been reduced
by more than 3%, while the share residing in the north had increased by 2%.
Formally, the policy of assigning refugees to municipalities was in place from
1985 to 1994. However, the strictest application of the assignment policy took
place between 1987 and 1991. During this period, almost 90% of the refugees
were assigned an initial municipality of residence by the Immigration Board.
There were no restrictions on ex post mobility, except that the refugees lost
some activities granted in an introduction programme of about 18 months.
We exploit this natural experiment to analyse whether the mobility decisions
of immigrants and their labour market outcomes are systematically related to
attitudes in the di¤erent regions. We mainly use an unbalanced panel of data
from 1996 to 2003, including only those immigrants that arrived in the period
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1987 to 19914 .
Immigrants are not a homogeneous group and we believe that not all of them
are equally a¤ected by negative attitudes. We will divide the immigrants into
three groups by origin. Group B consists of immigrants from Africa and non
developed countries of Asia. Group G consists of immigrants from South Amer-
ica and Eastern Europe. The third group called W is composed by immigrants
from developed countries. These immigrants are not refugees, they were never
placed and we expect them to be much less a¤ected by negative attitudes. We
include them as a placebo group.
We also di¤erentiate immigrants by their level of education. We call those
immigrants who have attained at least high school "well educated".
We recognize that the placement of immigrants in a region may exacerbate
negative attitudes towards them. This problem is addressed by considering
the data on attitudes measured prior to the refugee settlement policy. For
this reason, we assume attitudes to be constant in the short run. If we allow
attitudes to vary over time, they will be strongly inuenced by the refugees
arrival. Note that almost 60% of the immigrants living in Sweden in 2003
arrived after February 1985, the last period of our attitude data. We will use
a measure of negative attitudes that is not directly caused by these last large
waves of immigration.
3.1 Data
Data on the labour market performance of immigrants is available in the Lon-
gitudinal Individual Data Base (LINDA) stored at Statistics Sweden. Income
registers and population census data constitute the core of the data set5 . It
contains information on 300 000 individuals annually plus a non-overlapping
sample of 20% of all immigrants. From this database, we obtain information
4 In section 5 we repeat the same analysis in a larger sample, composed by all immigrants
that arrived in the period 1985 to 1994, that is, the whole o¢ cial period of application of the
refugee settlement policy as a robustness test.
5See Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a presentation of this data set.
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about the immigrantsmonthly wage6 , country of origin, year of immigration,
the municipality where she lived upon arrival and where she lives now, her level
of education, age, civil status, etc.
We cannot observe which immigrants in LINDA are refugees, so we concen-
trate our analysis to those coming from non developed countries, i.e. those that
are more likely to have been placed by the government. In our groups of interest,
B and G, we include immigrants from countries outside Western Europe that
were not members of the OECD in 1985 and from Turkey. Immigrants from
developed countries constitute the group of "white" immigrants, W.
We obtain our measure of attitudes towards immigrants from ve cross-
sectional surveys on Swedish Opinion collected from 1979 to February 1985 by
Stiftelsen för Opinionsanalyser (SSD 0099, Göteborg University). The data was
collected through a mail survey sent to around 2 000 individuals aged 17-80.
We add the answers of all surveys to get more observations per municipality, all
in all 11 539 answers.
We are interested in the question: How important do you think less immi-
gration is? The possible answers (frequency in parenthesis) are: (1) very impor-
tant (25.75%), (2) quite important (23.45%), (3) not very important (11.35%),
(4) not important at all (ne now) (17.69%), (5) better with more immigrants
(3.13%), (6) hesitant (13.83%), (7) no answer (4.80%).
We construct a measure of negative attitudes by adding the number of indi-
viduals answering (1) or (2) and deducting the number of individuals answering
(5). This variable is normalized to vary between 0 and 1. A map of Sweden in
Figure 1 shows how attitudes are distributed throughout the country.
Table I includes descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in our study.
These include individual characteristics of the immigrants and municipal char-
acteristics of their location.
6 In 1996 and 1997, the data on monthly wage rates was not available for all individuals
employed in the private sector, while it covered all public employees incorporated in this
sample. LINDA contains full data on monthly wage rates from 1998, but not for all family
members.
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Table II has a richer description of the municipal characteristics where immi-
grants are divided by group and separated into stayers and movers. Stayers are
immigrants who still live in the municipality where they were placed. Movers
are immigrants who left their municipality of placement in any period from the
arrival to the year studied. Most immigrants moved before 1996 and very few
during the period 1996 to 2003. Stayers constitute 47% of group B and 60%
of group G immigrants. As is evident from the table, stayers were placed in
municipalities with less negative attitudes towards immigrants, a higher share
of immigrants from non developed countries, a larger population, better labour
market conditions and more social benets than movers. Those who moved
chose municipalities with more positive attitudes, a higher share of immigrants,
a larger population, better labour market conditions and more social benets
than the municipalities where they were placed. Well educated immigrants
(those who have attained at least high school) chose to move to a higher extent
than less educated immigrants. Group B immigrants moved to a higher extent
than group G immigrants. Movers appear to earn higher wages than stayers for
both levels of education.
Table III characterizes the initial and nal location of immigrants who came
from developed countries in the same period. The "white" immigrants were
never placed, they chose themselves where to live already upon arrival and
62% stayed in that rst location. Those who moved chose municipalities with a
smaller share of immigrants from non developed countries, a smaller population,
better labour market conditions and lower social benets.
The location choices of immigrants suggested by these means are consistent
with our theory. Both the average group B mover and the average group G
mover chose to move towards more positive attitudes. Those who decided to
stay had been placed in municipalities with more positive attitudes. Group B
immigrants (ethnically more distant from Swedes and coming from less pros-
perous countries) moved to a higher extent than group G immigrants and both
groups moved more than group W immigrants. But this is just a comparison of
means, we need a deeper analysis of the data to measure the e¤ect of negative
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attitudes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
We want to estimate the e¤ect of negative attitudes on the wages and the loca-
tion decision of immigrants represented in equation (2). Larsen and Waisman
(2007) show that, in the presence of discrimination, immigrantswages are neg-
atively a¤ected by the share of immigrants in the economy. Living in a region
with many immigrants could also be positive, if immigrants form social networks
that allow members to help each other in the labour market. Both the direct
e¤ect and the incentive to form networks may depend on how negative the at-
titudes towards immigrants are in the region. Similarly, the e¤ect of attitudes
on local amenities may vary depending on how many other immigrants live in
the municipality. We take this into account and incorporate a term allowing for
an interaction between negative attitudes and the share of immigrants in our
wage and amenities equations. We assume the wage and amenity functions in
equation (1) above to take the form
wjit
 
dj

= dj01 +

dj M jt
0
2 +X
j0
t 3 + Y
0
ti4 + "
j
it
= E

wjit
 
dj

+ "jit; "
j
it  N
 
0; 2

for j = p;m
Ajit
 
dj

= dj01 +

dj M jt
0
2 + Z
j0
t 3; for j = p;m
Ci = Y
0
ti;
where M jt is the share of immigrants from non developed countries living in
municipality j in period t; Xjt are municipal characteristics that a¤ect wages,
"jit is a residual term or shock to individual i
0s wage, Zjt are municipal charac-
teristics that a¤ect amenities and Yti are individual characteristics. We will call
p the municipality of placement and m the municipality where an immigrant is
considering to move. The cost of moving is assumed to depend on individual
characteristics only.
When we estimate equation (2) above for the movers, we observe the wage
that the immigrant received in municipality m; wmit (d
m) ; but we need to esti-
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mate the wage he/she had received if he/she had stayed in the municipality of
placement, wpit (d
p) : An immigrant is a mover if
wmit (d
m) +Amit (d
m) > wpit (d
p) +Apit (d
p) + Ci;
wmit (d
m)  E (wp (dp)) + [Amit (dm) Apit (dp)]  Ci > "pit; (3)
where
Amit (d
m) Apit (dp) =
(
  (dp0   dm0)0 1  
h
(dp Mpt )0   (dm Mmt )0
i
2
   Zp0t   Zm0t 0 3
)
:
For a stayer, we observe the wage she receives in the municipality of place-
ment, but we need to estimate what she would counterfactually receive in a
target municipality. We cannot observe to which municipality an immigrant
considered moving, if she decided to stay. We dene the target municipality
of stayers as the average municipality where all immigrants have chosen to live
in our sample. In this way, we use the immigrantsown revealed preferences
when we determine what the potential target would have been7 . The alter-
native destinations are therefore collapsed into a single alternative, the target
municipality. An immigrant is a stayer if
wmit (d
m) +Amit (d
m)  wpit (dp) +Apit (dp) + Ci;
wpit (d
p)  E (wmit (dm)) + [Apit (dp) Amit (dm)] + Ci > "mit : (4)
We initially assume that the residuals in the wage equations for movers (3)
and stayers (4), "pit and "
m
it ; are independent of each other. This assumption
may not be realistic. High ability immigrants that have positive residuals upon
placement are likely to also have positive residuals after moving. We can actually
test if this is the case by looking at the small group of immigrants that moved
from the municipality where they had been placed upon arrival (1987-1991)
during the period 1996-2003 and for which we can observe wages in both the
7We have tried with other potential targets, for example an average of the ten most pre-
ferred municipalities (as revealed by immigrantschoices). There was no substantial change
in the results.
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municipality of placement and the municipality of their nal location8 . For this
particular group of immigrants, we can calculate an average wage throughout
the period both upon placement and where they chose to move and estimate
the correlation between these average wages. The correlation turns out to be
positive and high. For this reason, we will present results where the residuals
are assumed to be independent, as well as results where we incorporate the
estimated correlation among residuals.
We include several covariates and controls, so that the di¤erences in the
wages and amenities are not determined by di¤erences in the labour market
opportunities or geographical characteristics of the regions themselves. Con-
trolling by xed e¤ects at the individual level does not help because we have
very few individuals that moved during the period in our sample and for which
we can observe wages both before and after moving. We consider as movers all
immigrants that chose to move from their rst location in the country, even if
this happened before the period in our analysis.
Identication rests on the assumption that the e¤ect of negative attitudes on
the wages and location decisions of group B and G immigrants are independent
of the residual terms in (3) and (4), ": Identication fails if some other factor
determines both the level of attitudes and the di¤erences in wages and amenities
in the region, through its e¤ect on the residual terms. It could be imagined,
for example, that a generally bad labour market causes poor outcomes for re-
cent immigrants as well as negative attitudes among natives. The attitudes we
capture in our measure were displayed more than ten years before the period of
analysis, but a bad labour market may be persistent over time.
Attitudes are more negative in municipalities that had a high share of immi-
grants from non developed countries (0.08), higher average days of unemploy-
ment (0.11), and lower average wages (0.17) in the period 1996 to 2003. If we
go back in time, closer to the period in which these attitudes were revealed, we
can see that municipalities with more negative attitudes had lower employment
8This group only includes about 100 individuals. Most of the refugees that moved until
2003 had already moved by 1996.
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in 1985 (0.14) and more immigrants in 1979 (0.05). The correlation coe¢ cients
in parenthesis (weighted by population) are all signicantly di¤erent from zero
at the 1% level.
To check whether some other factor determines both the level of attitudes
and the di¤erences in wages and amenities in the region, we include a third
group in our analysis, immigrants from developed countries, that we expect not
to be a¤ected by attitudes. The idea is that if our estimation of the e¤ect of
attitudes on wages and amenities is the result of some other factor that produces
lower wages, we should estimate the same e¤ect on this placebo group.
There is no considerable di¤erence among the three groups of immigrants
with respect to individual characteristics. They have a similar average age
(37.6 for group W, 35.6 for group G and 34.6 for group B), a similar gender
composition (50% of group W immigrants are women, 56% of group G and 50%
of group B) and a similar civil status (56% of group W immigrants are married
or cohabitants, 52% of group G and 54% of group B). Most importantly, their
education level is not that di¤erent. We can compare the di¤erent education
levels of immigrants in a measure that scales from 0 (no education at all) to 6
(Ph.D. level). A value of 3 in this education measure corresponds to high school
education, so the variable "well educated" in our study corresponds to values
4, 5 and 6. The average level of education of white immigrants is 3.4 (with a
standard deviation of 1.47), while it is 3.2 (with a standard deviation of 1.4) for
immigrants from South America and Eastern Europe and 2.9 (with a standard
deviation of 1.4) for immigrants from Africa and non developed countries in
Asia.
3.3 Estimation Method
We estimate equations (3) and (4) for each group of immigrants separately.
Recall that group B consists of immigrants from Africa and non developed
countries of Asia, group G consists of immigrants from Eastern Europe and
South America and group W consists of immigrants from developed countries.
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Imposing the same slope coe¢ cients on all regressors in a common specication
(with dummy variables to allow for a di¤erent e¤ect of attitudes only) is not
very attractive as we want to allow for heterogeneity across groups.
In the model, we have assumed that the e¤ect of negative attitudes on wages
is the same for stayers and movers. We have tried an alternative specication,
separating the e¤ect of the variables of interest on the wages of stayers and
movers. The e¤ects of negative attitudes are somewhat stronger for movers
than for stayers, but the coe¢ cients are not very di¤erent for the two groups,
so we have chosen this specication to make the presentation simpler.
We estimate the e¤ect of negative attitudes on wages and the location deci-
sion by maximum likelihood. The maximium likelihood principle says that out
of all possible values for the di¤erent coe¢ cients and the residuals variance, the
values that make the likelihood of the observed data largest should be chosen.
The log likelihood function isX
si=0
ln (Pr (si = 0)) f (wit j si = 0) +
X
si=1
ln (Pr (si = 1)) f (wit j si = 1) ;
where si = 1 if the individual is a stayer and si = 0 if she is a mover. When
errors "pit and "
m
it are uncorrelated, we can write the log likelihood contributions,
based on (3) and (4), for the stayers


wpit   E (wmit ) + (Apit  Amit + Ci)


'
 
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p
it) ; 
2

,
and for the movers

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
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m
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
:
When we allow for correlated residuals, "pit  N
 
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
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0; 2
 
1  2 and  is the correlation coe¢ cient,
the log likelihood contributions become

 
wpit   E (wmit ) + (Apit  Amit + Ci)   (wpit   E (wpit))
 (1  2) 12
!
'
 
wpit; E (w
p
it) ; 
2

;
and

 
wmit   E (wpit)  (Apit  Amit + Ci)   (wmit   E (wmit ))
 (1  2) 12
!
'
 
wmit ; E (w
m
it ) ; 
2

:
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4 Results
Even if the e¤ect of attitudes on wages and location comes out of the same
regression, we present these results in two separate tables to simplify the ex-
position. Table IV presents the estimation of the  coe¢ cients, while table V
presents the estimation of the  and  coe¢ cients in equations (3) and (4).
4.1 Results for Wages
Table IV reports our results on the e¤ect of negative attitudes on wages for
the three groups of immigrants. To di¤erentiate immigrants by level of educa-
tion, we interact each variable of interest with a dummy that is equal to one
for "well educated" individuals, that is, those who have attained at least high
school. For groups B and G, we report both the results considering only nega-
tive attitudes and the results where negative attitudes are interacted with the
share of immigrants from non developed countries. We report results both with
independent and correlated residuals. All specications include individual con-
trols, municipal controls, region e¤ects, year e¤ects, dummies for the country
of origin and the number of refugees that arrived from the same country to the
same municipality in the period 1987 to 1991.
The individual controls are age, age squared, level of education, sex, civil
state and the years since immigration. The municipal controls include the aver-
age level of wages, the average days of unemployment and the average level of
social benets received in the municipality each year. The regional e¤ects are
considered at the county level (there were 24 counties and 288 municipalities in
Sweden in 1996). We cannot include xed e¤ects at the municipal level because
our measure of discrimination is constant. We estimate standard errors that are
robust to individual correlation by clustering per individual.
Negative attitudes reduce the wages of well educated group B immigrants
in all specications. Less educated immigrantswages are not a¤ected by neg-
ative attitudes. We will mainly concentrate on the last column for each group,
where residuals are correlated and the interaction between negative attitudes
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and the share of immigrants is taken into account. If attitudes improved from
the average level (0.5) to the most positive level (0), this would increase these
immigrantswages by 12%. The share of immigrants from non developed coun-
tries is associated with higher wages for all group B immigrants. An increase
in this share from the minimum possible level (0) to the average level (0.10)
would increase group B immigrantswages by 6%. In this sense, the e¤ect of
improving attitudes is twice as high as the potential network e¤ect or the e¤ect
of increasing the share of immigrants.
The e¤ect of negative attitudes on the wages of well educated group G im-
migrants has the same order of magnitude, still negative, but less precisely
estimated. It turns out to be signicantly di¤erent from zero only when the
interaction with the share of immigrants is considered. The share of immigrants
has no direct e¤ect on wages for group G, but a positive interaction term at-
tenuates the e¤ect of negative attitudes when we assume independent residuals.
The interaction term is still positive but much smaller and not signicantly dif-
ferent from zero when we take residual correlation into account. According to
the results in the last column, an improvement in attitudes from the average to
the most positive level would increase the well educated group G immigrants
wages by 13%.
Negative attitudes have no e¤ect at all on the wages of immigrants from
developed countries, our placebo groupW.We interpret these results as evidence
of discrimination in the labour market for well educated immigrants from less
developed countries. The average wages of well educated group W immigrants in
our sample are 20% (15%) higher than the average wages of well educated group
B (G) immigrants. A large part of this di¤erence could thus be explained by
discrimination9 . The e¤ects of the controls on immigrantswages are relatively
similar across groups. Wages are higher for immigrants living in municipalities
with higher average wages and immigrants that are well educated, older, male,
married or cohabitants and that have been longer in Sweden. In our estimation,
9Note that the comparison is made with similar immigrants that have been in the country
for an equally long period.
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the direct e¤ect of being well educated (attaining high school or higher) is an
increase in wages by 30% for group B and G immigrants, but almost half of that
increase is lost due to discrimination. The direct e¤ect of being well educated
is a rise in wages by 12% for group W immigrants.
4.2 Results for Mobility
Table V reports the results for the e¤ect of negative attitudes on the location
decision. The explanatory variables in this table represent, for each individual,
the di¤erence in the characteristics of the municipality of placement and the
target municipality. "Negative attitudes" denote the di¤erence between nega-
tive attitudes upon placement and at the nal or prospective location, that is,
(dp   dm). The municipal and individual controls are the same as those in Table
IV. The individual controls represent the cost of moving in the location decision.
There are additional controls that are assumed to a¤ect the location decision,
but not the wage of the immigrants. These "geographical variables" are the
ten-year average minimum temperature in the winter (January to March), lat-
itude (that inuences how dark a region is in the winter) and the size of the
population. In the literature on amenities, it is common to hypothesize that
people prefer moderate climates.
More negative attitudes reduce quality of life in a region for both group
B and group G immigrants, but the coe¢ cients are somewhat unstable across
specications. Immigrants in the placebo group W are not a¤ected by the di¤er-
ence in negative attitudes in their location decision. Once more, we concentrate
on the results with correlated residuals that incorporate the interaction between
negative attitudes and the share of immigrants from non developed countries.
For group B immigrants, the interaction term strengthens the e¤ect of the di¤er-
ence in negative attitudes on amenities, especially for less educated individuals.
The average share of immigrants is 0.10, so the total e¤ect for less educated
individuals in the average municipality is 0.69 ( 0:29  4  0:1) and for well
educated immigrants, it is 0.46 [ 0:29  (4  2:35)  0:1]. This means that less
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(well) educated immigrants in group B are willing to sacrice 34% (23%) of
their wages to enjoy living in a municipality with no negative attitudes instead
of the average level of negative attitudes. Group G immigrants are willing to
sacrice 11% of their wages for an improvement in attitudes.
Immigrants in group B and G enjoy living in a municipality with more immi-
grants around, while "white" immigrants feel that the attractiveness of a region
decreases with the di¤erence in the share of immigrants from non developed
countries. Group W immigrants are willing to sacrice 11% ( 1:14  0:1) of
their wages to live in a municipality without immigrants from non developed
countries, instead of the average share.
Also in the location decision are the e¤ects of the controls relatively similar
across groups. The value of amenities increases with the di¤erence in average
wages and decreases with the di¤erence in average days of unemployment and
social benets received in the municipality. Immigrants in group B value having
a higher temperature in the winter, especially the well educated ones, while
immigrants in group G instead value lower latitudes. The di¤erence in the size
of the population does not seem to be of any importance after controlling for
all other municipal and geographical variables. Group W immigrants care more
about the winter temperature than the latitude. In groups B and G, older
immigrants, less educated, women and those who are married or cohabitants
have a higher cost of moving In group W, age seems to be the only factor
determining the cost of moving.
Negative attitudes do a¤ect all immigrants from non developed countries,
but the e¤ect varies in strength and character. Negative attitudes a¤ect the
welfare of well educated immigrants through both wages and amenities, but
only the low educated immigrantsamenities. Well educated immigrants from
South America and Eastern Europe are more a¤ected than less educated im-
migrants of the same origin. All immigrants from Africa and non developed
countries in Asia su¤er more from negative attitudes than South Americans
and Eastern Europeans. This is consistent with the observation that group B
immigrants are ethnically and culturally more distant from Swedes and come
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from less prosperous countries and that they moved to a higher extent than
group G immigrants. Similarly, well educated immigrants, whose wages are
more a¤ected by attitudes in our results, moved to a higher extent than less
educated immigrants.
5 Robustness Tests
5.1 Alternative Specication
An alternative way of analysing the e¤ect of negative attitudes is to concentrate
on the wages of those immigrants that still live where they were placed by the
government according to the refugee settlement policy. If we do so, we need
to correct for the selection bias created by the fact that these individuals chose
themselves to stay in their placement municipality. We estimate the e¤ect of
negative attitudes on the wages of stayers using a Heckman-style selection bias
correction.
The results of the estimation are presented in table VI. The rst two columns
show the e¤ect of the variables of interest on the stayerswages. The last two
columns show the e¤ect of the "di¤erences" in the variables of interest, the
variables upon placement minus the variables in the target municipality, on the
location decision. In this case, we have not been able to compute the results for
the three groups of origin in separate regressions, due to lack of convergence.
Therefore, we used dummy variables to distinguish the e¤ects of the variables
of interest on the wages and location decisions of the stayers in group B, G and
W. In this way, we are restricting the coe¢ cients for the individual and the
municipal controls in the wage equation to be the same for all three groups. We
use dummies to allow for di¤erent coe¢ cients for the municipal and geographical
variables in the location equation.
In the interpretation of the results, we concentrate on the results in the
second and fourth columns which allow for the interaction between attitudes
and the share of immigrants from non developed countries. In this setting, we
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nd that negative attitudes reduce the wages of well educated stayers from Africa
and Asia, even though a positive interaction e¤ect attenuates this reduction in
municipalities with many immigrants from non developed countries. Improving
attitudes from the average level to zero would reduce the stayerswages by 6%
in the average municipality, if we take the interaction term into account. The
wages of South American and Eastern European stayers are not a¤ected by
negative attitudes.
The wages of immigrants from developed countries that stayed in the rst
chosen location (they were never placed) are positively related to negative atti-
tudes and the share of immigrants from non developed countries in the region.
We have no good explanation for these positive coe¢ cients, but the fact that
group W wages increase with the negative attitudes shows that we are not cap-
turing the e¤ect of a third factor that a¤ects negative attitudes positively and
wages negatively for all workers.
With respect to the location decision, all immigrants from non developed
countries are less likely to stay in a municipality with more negative attitudes.
The e¤ect is stronger for immigrants from Africa and Asia, both directly (a more
negative coe¢ cient) and indirectly, through the interaction term. Immigrants
from developed countries prefer to stay in a municipality with more negative
attitudes, as shown by a positive interaction term. Immigrants from Africa
and Asia prefer to live in regions with a higher share of immigrants from non
developed countries. Immigrants from developed countries instead move away
from such regions.
In summary, the results in this alternative specication do not contradict
our main ndings.
5.2 Alternative Sample
We now repeat the same analysis in a larger sample, composed by all immigrants
that arrived in the period 1985 to 1994, that is, the whole o¢ cial period of
application of the refugee settlement policy. In the additional years, however,
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the placement of immigrants was less strict, meaning that more refugees were
allowed to choose their rst location. The exogenous source of variation in the
immigrantsrst location in Sweden is thus potentially a worse assumption for
this larger sample.
Tables VII and VIII report the results arising from repeating the same analy-
sis as in tables IV and V in the larger sample. We once more concentrate on
the results that incorporate the interaction with the share of immigrants and
the correlation in the residuals of stayers and movers, that is, the last column
for each group of immigrants.
The results are very similar to those obtained with the smaller sample for im-
migrants from Africa and non developed countries in Asia. If negative attitudes
were reduced from the average level to zero, the wages of well educated group B
immigrants would increase by 11% and the value of amenities they enjoy would
rise by 17%. The same improvement in attitudes would increase the value of
amenities for low educated group B immigrants by 27%. So the total utility
cost of negative attitudes is equivalent to 27% of the wages for less educated
and 28% of the wages for well educated immigrants from Africa and Asia. This
utility cost is smaller than that estimated in the smaller sample (35%), but the
magnitude is still quite high. Immigrants from Africa and Asia receive higher
wages and a larger value of amenities if they live in a municipality with a higher
share of immigrants from non developed countries.
For immigrants from South America and Asia, the e¤ect on wages is very
small and has the wrong sign. A reduction in negative attitudes from the average
e¤ect to zero would increase wages by 2.5% through the interaction term. The
same reduction in negative attitudes increases the value of amenities for these
immigrants by 10%. So, the total utility cost of negative attitudes is equivalent
to 7.5% of the wages for all group G immigrants. Once more, the total e¤ect is
smaller than in the more restricted sample.
Negative attitudes do not a¤ect the wages of immigrants from developed
countries, while they increase the value of their amenities. Group W immi-
grants prefer to live in a municipality with less immigrants from non developed
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countries and more negative attitudes.
The controls are the same as in tables IV and V and have the expected signs.
The estimation of the e¤ect of attitudes on wages is less precise for group G
immigrants on this larger sample. Out of all immigrants in this group, 60% came
to Sweden between 1992 and 1994 and as many as 95% of the late arrivals came
from former Yugoslavia. It may be the case that these immigrants were more
similar to Swedes than the immigrants coming from the rest of Eastern Europe
and Latin America. This would explain why their wages were less a¤ected by
negative attitudes. Negative attitudes still inuence their location decisions as
much as it did for the group B immigrants in the benchmark sample. Immigrants
from Africa and Asia are more a¤ected than immigrants from South America
and Eastern Europe. Immigrants from developed countries actually benet from
negative attitudes which, once more, shows that we are not capturing the e¤ect
of a third factor that a¤ects negative attitudes positively and utility negatively
for all workers.
6 Conclusions
We nd that attitudes towards immigrants matter: they a¤ect both their labour
market outcomes and their quality of life. Well educated immigrants from non
developed countries receive lower wages when they live in a municipality with
more negative attitudes towards immigration. The average wages of well edu-
cated immigrants from developed countries in our sample are 17% higher than
the average wages of well educated immigrants from non developed countries.
If negative attitudes were to disappear, this would increase these immigrants
wages by 12%. In other words, 70% of the wage gap could be explained by
discrimination. The potential e¤ect of more positive attitudes is twice as high
as the potential network e¤ect or the e¤ect of increasing the share of immigrants
from non developed countries from zero to its average value.
All immigrants from non developed countries prefer to live in municipalities
where attitudes towards them are less negative. Our model implies that less
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educated immigrants from Africa and Asia are willing to sacrice as much as
34% of their wages to enjoy living in a municipality with zero negative attitudes,
instead of the average level. Well educated immigrants from Africa and Asia
would accept a reduction of 23% of their wages and immigrants from South
America and Eastern Europe a reduction of 11%, independently of their level
of education.
By their revealed location choices, immigrants from non developed countries
enjoy living in a municipality where there are similar immigrants, while "white"
immigrants appear to believe that the attractiveness of a region decreases with
the share of immigrants from non developed countries.
The fact that the wages and the quality of life of immigrants from developed
countries, our placebo group, are not a¤ected (or are a¤ected in the opposite
way) by negative attitudes indicates that we are not capturing the e¤ect of
omitted variables that have a positive e¤ect on negative attitudes and a negative
e¤ect on wages or amenities for all workers in a region.
A reduction in negative attitudes from the average level to zero would in-
crease the total welfare of immigrants from Africa and Asia, consisting of their
wage and quality of life, by an equivalent to the utility provided by one third
of their wage. The same amount for immigrants from South America and East-
ern Europe is one fourth of their wage if they are well educated and one tenth
otherwise. These e¤ects are really strong. If the attitudes towards immigrants
became more positive, it would make a large di¤erence for these individuals.
We end with two examples that may give a better concrete illustration of
how much attitudes matter.
The rst example is Lund, a municipality with much less negative attitudes
than the average. Placed immigrants tend to stay and many immigrants placed
in other municipalities choose to move to Lund. Lund is a municipality in Skåne,
southern Sweden. The city of Lund has more than 76 000 inhabitants and is
believed to have been founded around the year 990, when the Scanian lands
belonged to Denmark. It soon became the Christian centre of Northern Europe
with an archbishop and the towering Lund Cathedral. Lund University, estab-
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lished in 1666, is Swedens largest university. Lund is an island of immigrants
acceptance (A = 0:302) in a county where attitudes are very negative. In our
sample, 66 immigrants from Africa and non developed countries of Asia were
placed in Lund during the period 1987 to 1991. As many as 59 immigrants with
the same continents of origin that were placed in other municipalities chose to
move to Lund. Out of the 54 immigrants placed in Lund who decided to stay,
our model estimates that almost 90% would not have stayed had the attitudes
not been so much more negative in the target municipality.
The second example is Orust, a municipality where attitudes are more nega-
tive than the average. Most placed immigrants have chosen to move away from
Orust. Orust is an island and municipality in Bohuslän on the West Coast, Swe-
dens third-largest island with an area of 346 km2. The island has just over 15
000 residents, but this gure increases in the summer. Most of the municipality
consists of countryside, with a number of small population centres. Eight immi-
grants from Africa and non developed countries in Asia were placed in Orust,
where our measure of attitudes is higher than the average (A = 0:545). One of
them stayed, one moved to a municipality with even more negative attitudes,
while the remaining six moved to municipalities with more positive attitudes.
According to our estimation, half of these immigrants would not have moved
had the attitudes to them in Orust not been negative.
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Table VI 
Heckman Selection Bias Correction 
Immigrants that arrived 1987 - 1991 
 
Effects on:  Wages  Location 
-0.02 0.01 -0.21 -0.80 *** Negative Attitudes * group B 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.14) (0.17) 
-0.24 ** -0.52 ** 0.16 0.07 Negative Attitudes * group B *  
well educated (0.11) (0.21) (0.29) (0.36) 
0.05 0.11 -0.50 ** -0.55 ** Negative Attitudes * group G 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.24) (0.28) 
-0.09 -0.33 0.22 0.02 Negative Attitudes * group G *  
well educated (0.12) (0.21) (0.44) (0.49) 
0.22 *** 0.19 *** -0.30 0.00 Negative Attitudes * group W 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.27) (0.25) 
0.01 -0.22 0.16 0.00 Negative Attitudes * group W *  
well educated (0.11) (0.20) (0.53) (0.53) 
 -0,38  3.92 *** % immigrants ND countries  
* group B  (0.50)  (0.36) 
 -1.67  0.11 % immigrants NDC * group B  
* well educated  (1.28)  (0.75) 
 -0.76  0.48 % immigrants ND countries  
* group G  (0.62)  (0.55) 
 -2.34  1.38 % immigrants NDC * group G  
* well educated  (1.76)  (1.22) 
 2.20 **  -2.32 *** % immigrants ND countries  
* group W  (1.01)  (0.72) 
 -0.63  -1.82 % immigrants NDC * group W  
* well educated  (2.10)  (1.46) 
 1.04  -11.45 *** Neg. Attitudes * % immigrants  
NDC * group B  (0.87)  (2.32) 
 4.00 *  -3.58 Neg. Attitudes * % immig. NDC 
* group B * well educated  (2.28)  (4.45) 
 1.34  -0.83 Neg. Attitudes * % immig. NDC 
* group G  (1.08)  (3.68) 
 4.87  -6.96 Neg. Attitudes * % immig. NDC 
* group G * well educated  (3.15)  (6.20) 
 -2.75  7.78 * Neg. Attitudes * % immig. NDC 
* group W  (1.85)  (4.00) 
 1.64  -7.17 Neg. Attitudes * % immig. NDC 
* group W * well educated  (3.89)  (8.69) 
Lambda   -0.01 -0.03 
Observations 92044 
Individuals (clusters) 15886 
Controls: same as in Tables IV (effects on wages) and V (effects on location). 
 * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% and *** significant at the 1% level. 
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